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THE  DOUBLE  STANDARD  FOR  THIRD-PARTY
STANDING: JUNE  MEDICAL  AND  THE




No jurisdictional principle is more fundamental to the federal judiciary
than the doctrine of standing.  Before litigants may avail themselves of the
tremendous power vested in the federal judiciary, plaintiffs must first estab-
lish that they are appropriately situated to assert a legal claim before a court.
In analyzing whether a plaintiff possesses the requisite standing to maintain a
legal challenge, the Supreme Court has stressed that a court’s analysis must
be blind to the underlying dispute: “The fundamental aspect of standing is
that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court
and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.”1  Unfortunately, an
examination of the Supreme Court’s application of standing doctrine sug-
gests that the Court has peeked behind the veil to examine the underlying
claims of litigants, applying standing doctrine in an inconsistent manner to
legal challenges falling within a specific field of jurisprudence: abortion.
This Note contends that the Supreme Court has misapplied founda-
tional principles of standing to suits brought by plaintiffs challenging state
abortion regulations, departing from black letter standing requirements.  In
particular, this Note explains how the judiciary’s continued practice of
allowing abortion service providers and doctors to litigate the rights of nonli-
tigant, third-party women is at odds with the Supreme Court’s prudential
prohibition on third-party standing.
Part I lays out the current doctrinal framework of standing, noting the
various constitutional and prudential requirements a plaintiff must meet to
attain standing before a federal court.  Part II examines the jus tertii excep-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in
History and Political Thought, Concordia University Irvine, 2017.  I would like to thank
Professor O. Carter Snead for his guidance, Manoah Martin and Alyson Cox for their
valuable comments and suggestions, and my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for
their astute editing and relentless effort.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents, family,
and friends for their boundless love, sacrifices, and support.  All errors are my own.
1 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis added).
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tion to the general prohibition on third-party standing, emphasizing the
Court’s most recent and stringent pronouncement of the doctrine in Kowal-
ski v. Tesmer.2  Part III highlights the incompatibility of the jus tertii doctrine
with the prevalent practice, reaffirmed in June Medical Services, L.L.C. v.
Russo,3 of granting standing to abortion service providers to litigate the inter-
ests of nonlitigant, third-party women.  Part IV concludes by providing an
overview of the effect that third-party standing has had on the jurisprudential
landscape in abortion cases.
I. STANDING REQUIREMENTS
Standing requirements are a matter of justiciability that center on the
question of “whether [a] litigant is entitled to have the court decide the mer-
its of the dispute or of particular issues.”4  The Supreme Court has character-
ized the “gist of the question of standing” as an inquiry meant to ensure that
litigants before a court possess “such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness . . . sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.”5  The doctrine of standing is rooted in
both constitutional requirements and the exercise of prudential judicial
restraint,6 although the line between which requirements are compelled by
Article III and which are self-imposed by the judiciary is not always clear.7
The following overview traces the traditional outline of standing require-
ments, which previously comprised three constitutional and three prudential
elements.8  However, as will be illustrated in the discussion to follow, recent
developments by the Court have altered this framework, resulting in a cur-
rent formulation that entails four constitutional requirements and one pru-
dential rule.
A. Constitutional Requirements
The irreducible constitutional requirements for standing derive from
Article III, where the judicial power of the United States is authorized to
“extend to all Cases . . . [and] to Controversies.”9  This “case or controversy”
2 543 U.S. 125 (2004).
3 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion).
4 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
5 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
6 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
7 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (“[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court
whether particular features of the ‘standing’ requirement have been required by Art. III ex
proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which
were not compelled by the language of the Constitution.” (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968))).
8 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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requirement ensures that the suit before a court is a justiciable matter prop-
erly within a court’s constitutionally allocated power to entertain.10  Despite
the fact that a court’s judgment may incidentally affect nonlitigants, the judi-
cial power under Article III “exists only to redress or otherwise to protect
against injury to the complaining party.”11  Were it otherwise, courts would
be assuming a greater power than that which is constitutionally conferred to
the judiciary, upsetting the delicate balance of power between coequal
branches of government.12  The constitutional dimensions of the standing
requirement have been traditionally embodied in a threefold test.13  The
burden of proving the three elements of this constitutional test lies with the
party invoking federal jurisdiction.14
The first constitutional element requires the plaintiff to “have suffered
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest.”15  This injury
element is itself subject to two conditions—the injury must be “concrete and
particularized,”16 and it must also be “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’
or ‘hypothetical.’”17  Regarding the first of these conditions, the Court has
stated that “concrete” and “particularized” are conceptually distinct ideas.18
A concrete injury is merely one that is real and not abstract; “it must actually
exist.”19  A particularized injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a per-
sonal and individual way.”20  In other words, it is not enough that a cogniza-
ble interest is being injured; “the party seeking review [must] be himself
10 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
11 Id. at 499.
12 See id. at 498 (stating that both the constitutional and prudential dimensions of
standing requirements operate as limitations on the judiciary’s authority, “founded in con-
cern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”
(first citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–27 (1974);
and then citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188–97 (1974) (Powell, J., con-
curring)); see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (“No principle
is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.  The
concept of standing is part of this limitation.” (citation omitted)); Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488–89 (1923) (declaring that for a court to merely prevent the execution of
an unconstitutional congressional act where the plaintiff has no standing would result in
the courts “assum[ing] a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and
co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess”).
13 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“Over the years, our cases have established that the irreduci-
ble constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.”).
14 Id. at 561.
15 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4 n.1 (3d ed. 2008) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
16 Id.
17 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)).
18 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“Concreteness . . . is quite
different from particularization.”).
19 Id.
20 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
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among the injured.”21  The second condition of the “injury in fact” ele-
ment—requiring the presence of an “actual or imminent harm”—introduces
a probabilistic component that is designed to ensure that the alleged injury is
not overly speculative, which would fail the Article III requirement that
courts preside solely over actual cases or controversies.22
The second constitutional factor requires the alleged injuries to share a
causal relationship with the conduct complained of before the court.23  This
factor requires the injury to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.”24  Like any causation requirement in
law, the question of causation in standing raises intractable questions of
degree and remoteness.25  While “the indirectness of [an] injury does not
necessarily deprive [a] person harmed of standing to vindicate his rights,”
such claims are “substantially more difficult” to maintain under Article III
standing requirements, which require the plaintiff to show that the injury is a
“consequence of the defendants’ actions.”26
The third constitutional element centers on the redressability of the
alleged injury.27  To satisfy this prong of the test, it must be “likely” rather
than merely “speculative” that a favorable ruling by the court will redress the
injury.28  While the plaintiff need not show with certainty that the injury
would be remedied with a favorable ruling, the plaintiff must demonstrate “a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress
the claimed injury.”29  Additionally, the remedy cannot be unrelated to the
injury suffered by the plaintiff—a mere “vindication of the rule of law”—but
must rather work to redress a cognizable injury.30  “Relief that does not rem-
21 Id. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).
22 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at § 3531.4 n.164 (“The element of ‘actual or
imminent harm’ is probabilistic.  The purpose is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative for Article III purposes.”).  When the only alleged injury is one that may occur
“at some indefinite future time,” and the “acts necessary to make the injury happen are at
least partly within the plaintiff’s own control,” courts will require the plaintiff to show a
“high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no
injury would have occurred at all.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2.
23 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
24 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41–42 (1976)).
25 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at § 3531.5.
26 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  Some courts have described the redressability element as
“the core of the standing doctrine.”  E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 450 (2d
Cir. 2014).  “An abstract decision without remedial consequence seems merely advisory, an
unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources that burdens the adversary and carries all
the traditional risks of making bad law and trespassing on the provinces of the executive
and legislature.”  13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at § 3531.6.
28 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
29 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978).
30 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106–07 (1998) (finding that
plaintiff gratification of seeing defendant punished does not satisfy the redressability
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edy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is
the very essence of the redressability requirement.”31
B. Prudential Requirements
In addition to the threshold constitutional requirements, the judiciary
has crafted self-imposed limits “designed to deny standing as a matter of judi-
cial prudence rather than constitutional command.”32  While prudential lim-
its are “closely related to Art. III concerns,” they are nevertheless “matters of
judicial self-governance”33 that can be waived by the Court or overridden by
congressional acts that grant standing to sue.34  The purpose of these pru-
dential limitations is to ensure that courts are not “called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmen-
tal institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even
though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.”35  Traditionally, the Court has imposed three prudential limita-
tions.36  However, due to the Court’s recent reformations in standing doc-
trine, only one of the three factors—the prohibition on third-party
standing—remains as a prudential standing requirement.37
The first prudential requirement prohibited the “adjudication of genera-
lized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches.”38  A generalized grievance is one where the alleged injury affects
“every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,”
and the relief sought “no more directly and tangibly benefits [the plaintiff]
than it does the public at large.”39  Previously conceived as a prudential limi-
requirement because “psychic satisfaction . . . does not redress a cognizable Article III
injury”).
31 Id. at 107.
32 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at § 3531.7.  For a critique of prudential standing
requirements, see Kylie Chiseul Kim, The Case Against Prudential Standing: Examining the
Courts’ Use of Prudential Standing Before and After Lexmark, 85 TENN. L. REV. 303, 305 (2017).
33 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
34 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2117 (2020) (plurality opinion);
Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 151 (2014); see, e.g., FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (ruling that congressional provisions within a legislative act
granting standing to any person who believes a violation of the act occurred was sufficient
to overcome prudential standing limits).
35 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
36 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014)
(quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)); Young, supra
note 34, at 150.
37 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD MURPHY, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 8343 (2d ed. 2018) (“Of these three principles, only the first, the
doctrine of third-party standing or jus tertii, still remains in the prudential category.”).
38 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. 118.
39 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).
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tation,40 the Court recently recast the issue as a constitutionally mandated
requirement, declaring that suits over generalized grievances “do not present
constitutional ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’”41
The second prudential limitation required that “a plaintiff’s complaint
fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”42  In essence,
the zone-of-interest test was meant to determine whether the interest sought
to be protected by the plaintiff was an interest that was “protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”43  While the
zone-of-interest test was traditionally characterized as a prudential limitation
on standing,44 the Court has departed from this characterization of the issue.
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the Court recast
the zone-of-interest inquiry as a question of statutory interpretation meant to
determine “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a
particular plaintiff’s claim.”45  Accordingly, the zone-of-interest test is no
longer a question of standing at all but is now only an inquiry into whether a
plaintiff has a cause of action under a congressional statute that authorizes
plaintiffs to bring suit.46
The third and final prudential limitation, which is the only rule to retain
its prudential characterization,47 is the “general prohibition on a litigant’s
raising another person’s legal rights.”48  This requirement effectively pre-
vents a litigant from asserting the legal rights of a third party who is not a
litigant in the underlying suit.49  Although the rule against third-party stand-
ing remains a prudential requirement,50 its categorization as such is far from
firmly cemented.  While stopping short of recharacterizing the rule as a con-
40 See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Sepa-
ration of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982).
41 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 127 n.3 (“[Generalized grievances] are barred for constitu-
tional reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.”).  While the Court formally recast the prohibition of
generalized grievances as a constitutional requirement in Lexmark, the Court suggested
that the recharacterization of the element was evident in a number of the Court’s prior
decisions. Id. (first citing first Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam);
then citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344–46 (2006); and then citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74).  The Court’s rationale for characterizing the prohibition on
generalized grievances as a constitutional factor was based on the fact that when a court
adjudicates a generalized grievance, the court is no longer deciding on the rights of indi-
viduals, but is instead engaged in “[v]indicating the public interest,” which “is the function
of Congress and the Chief Executive.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
42 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75).
43 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
44 See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Sarah F. Bothma, A Practitioner’s Guide to Federal Pru-
dential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 39
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 199, 199 (2015).
45 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014).
46 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3531.7.
47 33 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 8343.
48 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
49 Kim, supra note 32, at 337–38.
50 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2117 (2020).
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stitutional requirement, the Court in Lexmark stated that “limitations on
third-party standing are hard[ ] to classify,”51 noting that some cases have
treated third-party standing as “closely related to the question [of] whether a
person in the litigant’s position would have a right of action on the claim.”52
However, the Court in Lexmark also noted that other cases have treated the
rule as a purely prudential issue.53  Because the issue of third-party standing
was a nonfactor in Lexmark, the Court noted that “consideration of [the
third-party standing] doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament can
await another day.”54  That day came and went six years after Lexmark in June
Medical as the Court punted on offering any clarification on the proper char-
acterization of the rule against third-party standing.55  Consequently, the rule
is still considered a prudential requirement that is subject to forfeiture or
waiver.56  As a prudential rule, the justification for the prohibition on third-
party standing rests on several policy grounds.  These include: protecting a
third-party’s rights from being bound by unfavorable precedent created by
those who fail in their litigation to enforce the rights of nonlitigants, institu-
tional concerns regarding the judiciary’s unnecessary adjudication of the
constitutional rights of third parties who do not wish to assert their rights,
prioritizing the quality of litigation that stems from the belief that “third par-
ties . . . usually will be the best proponents of their own rights,” and the desire
to avoid judicial speculation on “every conceivable situation which might pos-
sibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation.”57
The general prohibition on third-party standing is well-illustrated in
Tileston v. Ullman.58  At issue in the case was the constitutionality of two Con-
necticut statutes that prohibited the use of drugs and instruments designed
to prevent conception, in addition to proscribing counsel or assistance as to
their use.59  The plaintiff—a registered physician—challenged the as-applied
constitutionality of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.60  In particular, the plaintiff alleged that application of the laws
51 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.3
(2014).
52 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Lab. v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990)).
53 Id. (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004)).
54 Id.  Until the Court alters its characterization of third-party standing, it remains the
last standing element the Court views as prudential in nature.  Brian Charles Lea, The
Merits of Third-Party Standing, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 285 (2015).
55 When describing the characterization of the rule against third-party standing, the
plurality in June Medical merely stated: “This rule is ‘prudential.’” June Med. Servs., 140 S.
Ct. at 2117 (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 128–29).  Neither the plurality opinion nor Chief
Justice Robert’s concurrence acknowledged the Court’s previous statements in Lexmark
suggesting that the prudential characterization of the rule ought to be reconsidered.
56 Id.
57 Lea, supra note 54, at 296 (alteration in original) (first quoting Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion); and then quoting United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21–22 (1960)).
58 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam).
59 Id. at 44.
60 Id. at 44–45.
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would prevent him from providing professional advice regarding the use of
contraceptives to three patients, all of whom suffered from health conditions
that would endanger their lives during childbearing.61  Noting that the “sole
constitutional attack upon the statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment
[was] confined to [the] deprivation of life,” the Court held that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the challenge because the claimed legal injuries
impacted the third-party, nonlitigant patients rather than the plaintiff doc-
tor.62  “His patients are not parties to this proceeding,” the Court declared,
“and there is no basis on which we can say that he has standing to secure an
adjudication of his patients’ constitutional right to life, which they do not
assert in their own behalf.”63
II. THE JUS TERTII DOCTRINE
As the only remaining prudential requirement, the rule against third-
party standing is subject to exceptions based on countervailing policy consid-
erations.64  The two most prominent judicially crafted exceptions to third-
party standing include the jus tertii doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine.65
The latter of these exceptions applies solely to First Amendment challenges
and is thus not relevant to the discussion of third-party standing in the con-
text of abortion jurisprudence.66
The jus tertii doctrine “allows a litigant in some circumstances to succeed
in challenging government action on the ground that it infringes the rights
of a third party.”67  The Court’s first application of the jus tertii doctrine was
in its 1953 decision in Barrows v. Jackson.68  In the years following, the stan-
dards for allowing third-party standing under the jus tertii doctrine have
evolved, leading to the Court’s most recent formulation of the exception in
its 2004 decision in Kowalski v. Tesmer.69
In Barrows v. Jackson, the Court was asked to determine whether a defen-
dant could assert the rights of a third party as a defense to the plaintiff’s
allegation that the defendant had breached a race-based restrictive cove-
nant.70  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the
terms of the agreement entered between the parties by allowing non-Cauca-
61 Id.
62 Id. at 46.
63 Id.
64 Lea, supra note 54, at 286, 296; see also June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct.
2103, 2117–19 (2020).
65 Lea, supra note 54, at 297.
66 Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (1984).
67 Lea, supra note 54, at 299.
68 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Lea, supra note 54, at 299.
69 543 U.S. 125 (2004); see June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2170–71 (Alito, J., dissenting);
Stephen J. Wallace, Note, Why Third-Party Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer Look, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1383–92 (2009).  For a discussion on the history of exceptions
to third-party standing leading to the modern formulation of the jus tertii doctrine, see Lea,
supra note 54, at 287–302.
70 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 251.
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sians to reside on specified property, in addition to conveying land without
incorporating the terms of the covenant into the new deed.71  The Court
began its analysis by recognizing that, while private and voluntary enforce-
ment of racially based covenants was permissible, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited the judiciary from enforcing such agreements when doing
so would result in the violation of a party’s constitutionally protected right to
equal protection.72  However, the Court also noted that “no non-Caucasian
[was] before the Court claiming to have been denied his constitutional
rights.”73  Thus, the Court was faced with a crucial standing question: May
the defendant assert the rights of nonlitigant third parties as a defense to
violating the covenant?74  The Court answered the question in the affirma-
tive, noting that “it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose
rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court.”75  The cor-
nerstone of the Court’s decision rested on the fact that “the reasons which
underlie our rule denying standing to raise another’s rights . . . are out-
weighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which would be
denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.”76
Following the decision in Barrows, the Court wrestled with defining the
precise purpose of jus tertii standing and with formulating a test to determine
when use of the doctrine was warranted.77  However, a plurality opinion by
the Court eventually established a two-part test for the doctrine in Singleton v.
Wulff.78  In articulating the rationale for the test’s formulation, the Court
summarized two primary justifications for the existence of the rule against
third-party standing:79
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may
be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them,
71 Id. at 252.
72 Id. at 253–54 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
73 Id. at 254.
74 Id. at 254–55.
75 Id. at 257.
76 Id.
77 See Lea, supra note 54, at 299–300. Compare Robert Allen Sedler, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 627 (1962) (stating that an
analysis of decisions by the Court revealed that “there are four factors which the Court
takes into account in determining the scope of standing to assert the rights of others”),
with Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Court has
looked primarily to two factual elements to determine whether the rule [against third-party
standing] should apply in a particular case.”), and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) (stating that the Court has “looked at three factors”
when determining the validity of third-party standing, the third factor being “the impact of
the litigation on third-party interests”), and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991)
(characterizing the Singleton rubric as a three-factor criterion, the first factor being the
“injury in fact” requirement (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 112)).
78 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–16 (plurality opinion); see Lea, supra note 54, at 300.
79 Although the Court conveyed the rationales for the rule against third-party standing
in two reasons, the twin justifications the Court laid forth encompass many of the pruden-
tial considerations presented earlier. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not.  Second, third parties themselves usually will be the best
proponents of their own rights.  The courts depend on effective advocacy,
and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most
effective advocates of those rights are before them.  The holders of the rights
may have a like preference, to the extent they will be bound by the courts’
decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis.80
With these concerns outlined, the Court proceeded by establishing the “two
factual elements” required to assert third-party standing.81  Under the
Court’s rubric, a litigant could seek the vindication of a third party’s rights if:
“(1) [T]he litigant has a close relationship with the third party, which touches
upon the asserted third-party right; and (2) there ‘is some genuine obstacle’ to
the third party’s assertion of her own rights.”82
Under the “close relationship” prong of the test, the Court specified that
the nature of the relationship must be such that the third party’s right which
the litigant wishes to vindicate is “inextricably bound up with the activity the
litigant wishes to pursue.”83  This factor, the Court reasoned, would ensure
that the third-party right was not unnecessarily litigated since vindication of
the right would, at a minimum, affect the litigant raising the legal chal-
lenge.84  Additionally, the Court emphasized that the relationship between
the litigant and the third party should be one where the litigant “is fully, or
very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right” as the third-party right-
sholder,85 effectively requiring the litigant and nonlitigant third party to
share aligned interests in the underlying dispute.86  Finally, the Court
80 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113–14 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (citing Ashwan-
der v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
81 Id. at 114.
82 Lea, supra note 54, at 300 (emphasis added) (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–18
(plurality opinion)).
83 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15 (plurality opinion).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 115.
86 Wallace, supra note 69, at 1384; see Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (finding that the “congru-
ence of interests” between a litigant and the third party justified jus tertii standing); Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (finding that a parent did not
have standing to vindicate the rights of his daughter because the interests of the parties
“[were] not parallel and, indeed, are potentially in conflict”); see also Lepelletier v. FDIC,
164 F.3d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]here must be an identity of interests between the
parties such that the plaintiff will act as an effective advocate of the third party’s inter-
ests.”); Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[C]onflicts of interests
between the plaintiff and the third party whose rights are asserted matter[ ] a good
deal. . . .  [W]e have held that genuine conflicts strongly counsel against third party stand-
ing.” (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1000 (3d Cir. 1988)); Canfield Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 854 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[C]ourts must be
sure . . . that the litigant and the person whose rights he asserts have interests which are
aligned . . . .”); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768 (3d ed. 2005) (“It is axiomatic that a putative representa-
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“place[d] primary reliance on . . . the existence of a ‘confidential relation-
ship’ between the rightholder and the party seeking to assert her rights,”87
such as in the context of a doctor-patient relationship where physicians may
seek to assert the rights of their patients.88  This requirement was intended to
ensure that “the litigant bears the sort of relationship to the right-holder that
portends vigorous prosecution of the right in the litigation.”89
Turning to the “genuine obstacle” factor, the Court noted that even
when the relationship between the litigant and third party is close, “the rea-
sons for requiring persons to assert their own rights will generally still
apply.”90  However, when a “genuine obstacle” prevents the third party from
bringing their claim, “the third party’s absence from court loses its tendency
to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and
the party who is in court becomes by default the right’s best available
proponent.”91
Although Singleton provided a metric for analyzing the appropriateness
of granting third-party standing, the Court’s rubric was deficient in at least
two ways.  First, the Court’s later rulings inconsistently characterized the Sin-
gleton framework, treating the multifactor inquiry as factors to be balanced in
some cases, but demanding complete conformity with the test in others.92
Second, the latitude with which the Court has interpreted both prongs of the
test has waxed and waned over time.  Justice Blackmun’s use of the phrase
“genuine obstacle” in the Singleton plurality opinion was met with criticism in
Justice Powell’s four-member partial dissent, the latter opinion contending
that the Court’s prior precedents had allowed for jus tertii standing only when
the ability of third parties to litigate their own rights was “in all practicable
tive cannot adequately protect the class if the representative’s interests are antagonistic to
or in conflict with the objectives of those being represented.”).
87 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 127 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 Id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
89 Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitu-
tional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1171
(2008).
90 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116 (plurality opinion).
91 Id.
92 Michael A. Frattone, Note, Constitutional Law—Third Circuit Sets Forth Balancing Test
for Evaluating Jus Tertii Standing in First Amendment Context: Amato v. Wilentz (1991), 38 VILL.
L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1993). Compare Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617, 623–24 n.3 (1989) (holding that while there was no genuine obstacle preventing
the third party from asserting his rights, the balance of factors weighed in favor of granting
the litigant jus tertii standing), with Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (characterizing the third-party
standing test as a rubric where all criteria must be satisfied).  Notably, although both Cap-
lin and Powers characterize the test as containing three factors (with each case outlying a
different third factor), the Court’s most recent pronouncement of the test confirms that
the test only includes the original two factors outlined in Singleton.  Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543
U.S. 125, 130 (2004).
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terms impossible.”93  Over time, the Court drifted towards Justice Black-
mun’s more lax standard of a mere “genuine obstacle.”94  Likewise, the
“close relationship” prong of the rubric was construed with equal liberality,
with the Court “grant[ing] third-party standing in a number of cases to liti-
gants whose relationships with the directly affected individuals were at best
remote.”95  However, the Court’s most recent pronouncement of the jus tertii
doctrine in Kowalski v. Tesmer shed much-needed clarification on these issues,
reinvigorating both prongs of the test with an increased level of strictness and
rigor.96
In Kowalski, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a
Michigan statute that prohibited the appointment of appellate counsel for
indigent litigants who plead guilty.97  The initial litigants—two attorneys and
three indigent criminal defendants—argued that the statute deprived the
three criminal defendants of their federal due process and equal protection
rights.98  By the time the case had reached the Supreme Court, the only
remaining litigants challenging the Michigan law were the two attorneys,
leaving the Court to decide whether the litigants could seek vindication of
rights belonging to the nonlitigant, third-party indigents.99
The Court began by asserting that litigants who seek third-party standing
are “require[ed to] . . . make two additional showings,” thereby framing both
prongs of the Singleton test as necessary elements rather than factors to be
balanced.100  Under the “close relationship” prong, the Court found that
93 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion did not join the plurality’s analysis on the issue of jus
tertii. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
94 Lea, supra note 54, at 301–02; see, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398
(1998) (holding that “the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial reward
available” to third parties excluded from jury selection on the basis of race constituted a
sufficient obstacle to justify third-party standing).  For an overview of the lax approach the
Court has taken with the “genuine obstacle” prong of the third-party standing test, see
Wallace, supra note 69, at 1389–92.
95 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134 (Thomas, J., concurring); see, e.g., Carey v. Population
Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683 (1977) (holding that a mail-order contraceptive seller may
assert the rights of their “potential customers”); Powers, 499 U.S. at 413 (holding that a
defendant may assert the right of a juror excluded from service because “[v]oir dire permits
a party to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors”).
96 See Elizabeth Slattery, Revisiting Third-Party Standing in the Context of Abortion, HERI-
TAGE FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/life/report/revisiting-third-party-
standing-the-context-abortion; see also Wallace, supra note 69, at 1398–99; June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2170–71 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court’s holding in Kowalski “refined our rule for third-party standing”).
97 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 127–28 (majority opinion).
98 Id. at 128.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 130; see also June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2174 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has a ‘“close” relationship’ with the per-
son whose rights he wishes to assert and that some ‘“hindrance”’ hampers the right-
holder’s ‘ability to protect his own interests.’” (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130)).
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there was an insufficient relationship between the attorneys and the indi-
gents because the indigent third parties were merely “hypothetical” clients
who were not represented by the attorneys in their underlying criminal pro-
ceedings.101  Consequently, the Court not only found that the litigants and
third parties lacked a “close relationship,” but that they shared “no relation-
ship at all.”102  As for the “genuine obstacle” element, the Court noted that
nothing prevented the third-party indigents from vindicating their rights as
pro se litigants, and thus they were not hindered from “advancing their own
constitutional rights.”103  In response, the attorneys maintained that unso-
phisticated pro se litigants “could not satisfy the necessary procedural
requirements, and . . . would be unable to coherently advance the substance
of their constitutional claim,” thereby constituting a genuine obstacle to the
vindication of their rights.104  The Court rejected this argument by pointing
to three instances—two before the Michigan Supreme Court, and one before
the United States Supreme Court—in which pro se defendants were able to
navigate the appellate process for their claims.105  Thus, while noting that
the assistance of an attorney would be “valuable to a criminal defendant,” the
Court deemed that the lack of an attorney was not “the type of hindrance
necessary to allow another to assert the indigent defendants’ rights.”106
The Court’s opinion in Kowalski marked a stark departure from the
Court’s previously broad approach to both the “close relationship” and “gen-
uine obstacle” elements of the jus tertii doctrine.107  While Justice Rehn-
quist’s majority opinion declined to draw explicit attention to this fact, the
shift did not go unnoted by the concurring and dissenting opinions.  Writing
in his concurrence, Justice Thomas chastised the latitude given to litigants to
assert third-party rights in many of the Court’s prior decisions, emphasizing
the overly broad application of the “close relationship” prong.108  Noting
that the Court had “gone far astray” with its liberal allowance of jus tertii
standing, Justice Thomas explained that his support for the majority’s opin-
ion in the underlying case was due to the Court’s “reasonable application” of
prior precedent.109  Conversely, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion also
noted the Court’s narrowing of the jus tertii doctrine.  Regarding the “close
relationship” requirement, Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court’s juris-
101 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131 (emphasis omitted).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 131–32.
104 Id. at 132.
105 Id.
106 Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
107 Wallace, supra note 69, at 1402; see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING,
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 15 (5th ed. Supp. 2007) (“Kowalski v. Tesmer . . . marked a clear
departure from the Court’s usual apparent practice of upholding third-party standing in
cases in which the underlying claim of third-party rights would appear to be substantially
meritorious.”).
108 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134–35 (Thomas, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 134, 136.
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prudence had not previously distinguished between “existing” and “hypothet-
ical” relationships as a metric to determine the adequacy of the litigant’s
relationship with the third party.110  On the contrary, Justice Ginsburg
argued that determining the nonexistence of a “close relationship” from the
lack of an existing relationship constituted a noticeable departure from many
of the Court’s prior holdings.111  Turning to the “genuine obstacle” prong,
Justice Ginsburg highlighted the factors that generally hinder criminal
defendants from asserting their own rights as pro se litigants, citing the lack
of high school education and extreme illiteracy that might make navigating
the legal regime extremely difficult.112  “An inmate so handicapped,” Justice
Ginsburg wrote, “surely does not possess the skill necessary to pursue a com-
petent pro se appeal.”113  For the Court to hold otherwise constituted more
than a slight narrowing of the “genuine obstacle” requirement.114
III. THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN ABORTION CASES
The Court’s ruling in Singleton established the archetypal model for
applying the jus tertii doctrine in the context of abortion litigation.115  In fact,
the plurality opinion in Singleton constitutes “the only opinion in which any
Members of [the] Court have ever attempted to justify third-party standing
for abortion providers.”116  Since the Singleton decision, federal courts have
frequently granted third-party standing to abortion service providers to liti-
gate the rights of nonlitigant, third-party women.  Indeed, “such cases are
often decided without even pausing to question the physician-plaintiff’s
standing.”117  The following analysis will articulate why exempting abortion
service providers from the general prohibition on third-party standing fails to
meet each prong of the two-part test for jus tertii standing—both as they were
initially conceived in Singleton,118 and especially so in light of the Court’s
110 Id. at 138–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
111 See id. at 138.
112 Id. at 140.
113 Id. at 140–41.
114 Justice Ginsburg noted that the “genuine obstacle” requirement was normally
approached with a “degree of elasticity,” and that even “a requirement with more starch
than [what] the Court has insisted upon in prior decisions” could not account for the
majority’s holding. Id. at 139–40.
115 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2322 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“In Singleton v. Wulff, a plurality of this Court fashioned a blanket rule
allowing third-party standing in abortion cases.” (citation omitted)); Slattery, supra note
96; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Symposium: After 40+ Years It Is Clear Women Can Speak for
Themselves, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/
01/symposium-after-40-years-it-is-clear-women-can-speak-for-themselves/.
116 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2169 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2147 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3531.9.3.
118 Even before the Court’s narrowing of the jus tertii doctrine test in Kowalski, the
Court’s own reasoning in Singleton conflicted with the black letter standard the Court
claimed to espouse. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2322–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
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recent articulation of the test in Kowalski.  The analysis concludes by evaluat-
ing the significance of the June Medical decision as the first abortion case
before the Court where the issue of third-party standing has been explicitly
raised since the Court’s refinement of the jus tertii doctrine in Kowalski.
A. Close Relationship
At issue in Singleton was a provision of Missouri’s Medicaid program that
excluded Medicaid funding for abortions that were not medically neces-
sary.119  The plaintiffs—two Missouri-licensed physicians—challenged the
constitutionality of the provision on the grounds that it infringed the rights
of third-party, nonlitigant women to seek abortions.120
The plurality opinion began by holding that the “close relationship”
prong of the test for third-party standing was satisfied, pointing to the Court’s
prior precedents that recognized the confidential nature of the doctor-
patient relationship.121  In particular, the plurality emphasized two aspects of
the relationship between abortion doctors and their patients to support the
Court’s conclusion.  First, the Court noted that a woman’s ability to “exercise
. . . her right to an abortion” was intrinsically linked with her ability to secure
the assistance of a physician, without whom she could not “safely secure an
abortion.”122  Second, the Court noted that a woman’s decision of whether
or not to have an abortion is a decision “in which the physician is intimately
involved.”123  Consequently, the plurality reasoned that “[a]side from the
woman herself,” the physician performing the abortion procedure was the
next best candidate to vindicate any impediment to a woman’s ability to
attain an abortion.124
The problem with the plurality’s reasoning in Singleton is threefold.
First, the Court’s description of the confidential relationship between the
patients seeking abortions and the doctors who perform them is a legal fic-
tion that frequently fails to comport with the reality of the situation faced by
women.  Second, the Court’s physician-patient exception to the prohibition
on third-party standing does not account for the multiple conflicts of inter-
ests between women and abortion service providers that should preclude the
finding of a “close relationship.”  Third, cases justifying the application of the
jus tertii doctrine in the abortion context have frequently done so when only
(“[T]he [Singleton] plurality conceded that the traditional criteria for an exception to the
third-party standing rule were not met.”).
119 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1976).
120 Id. at 113 (plurality opinion).  The physician-plaintiffs also challenged the Missouri
provision on the basis that it infringed their alleged constitutional right to perform abor-
tions. Id.  However, since the Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs had standing to
assert the rights of patients, the Court passed on addressing the question of whether the
plaintiffs had suffered any legal injury to their own rights sufficient to attain standing. Id.
121 Id. at 115, 117.
122 Id. at 117.
123 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–56 (1973)).
124 See id.
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a hypothetical doctor-patient relationship exists, which stands in direct con-
flict with the precedent established in Kowalski.
The first issue with granting abortion service providers jus tertii standing
is the Court’s reliance on the notion of a confidential relationship existing
between an abortion physician and a woman seeking an abortion, in which
the physician is “intimately involved” with the woman’s decision-making pro-
cess.  Justice Powell’s partial dissent was especially critical of this claim, not-
ing that “the ‘confidential’ relationship in a case of this kind often is set in an
assembly-line type abortion clinic.”125  History has borne out Justice Powell’s
concerns.  Individual physicians often perform numerous—sometimes hun-
dreds—of abortions every month.126  Some healthcare clinics hire doctors
“on a fee-per-procedure basis to perform large volumes of brief procedures
on sedated patients whom they never saw before and will never see again.”127
Compounding this problem is the fact that not only do some abortion prov-
iders only see their patients once, but they “often meet them only after the
patients have been sedated.”128  And when abortion physicians do meet with
their patients, the doctors rarely “delve into the emotional, moral, and socio-
logical aspects of the abortion decision in their consultations with pregnant
women seeking abortions.”129  Accordingly, the cumulative force of these fac-
tors has rendered “[t]he phrase ‘between a woman and her physician’ . . . an
empty one.”130
The second problem with granting abortion service providers third-party
standing is that it ignores the serious conflicts of interest that often exist
between abortion services providers and nonlitigant women, which evidences
the lack of a “close relationship” between the parties and the inappropriate-
ness of permitting jus tertii standing.131  Women undergoing abortive proce-
dures have a fundamental interest in minimizing risks posed to their own
health and safety, but abortion clinics have a countervailing interest in reduc-
125 Id. at 129–30 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126 See Slattery, supra note 96.
127 Brief for the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 47, June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460); see June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2168
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A] woman who obtains an abortion typically does not develop a
close relationship with the doctor who performs the procedure.  On the contrary, their
relationship is generally brief and very limited.”).
128 Amy Howe, Federal Government’s Brief in Abortion Case Supports Louisiana’s Position,
Raises Possibility of Overruling Whole Woman’s Health, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2020, 10:07
AM) (emphasis added), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/federal-governments-brief-
in-abortion-case-supports-louisianas-position-raises-possibility-of-overruling-whole-womans-
health/.
129 Mary Julia Regan Marcin & Raymond B. Marcin, The Physician’s Decision-Making Role
in Abortion Cases, 35 JURIST 66, 71 (1975) (summarizing an abortion provider’s critique of
Singleton).
130 Id. (quoting Bernard N. Nathanson, Sounding Board—Deeper into Abortion, 291 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1189, 1189 (1974)).
131 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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ing costs and avoiding time-consuming measures.132  Unsurprisingly, when
state regulations are advanced that pit the competing interests of costs and
safety against one another, “[i]t is nearly always abortion providers”—not
women—who challenge the regulatory standards.133  Strikingly, in medical
contexts outside of abortion, federal courts have readily recognized that the
competing interests of costs and safety are sufficiently adversarial to prevent
medical service providers from representing their patients’ interests.  For
example, in Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer & Standby Service, Inc. v. City of
Kansas City, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ambulance service
providers could not assert third-party standing on behalf of nonlitigant, third-
party patients because the ambulance companies “are principally interested
in operating their businesses profitably, while Kansas City-area residents are
principally concerned with receiving high quality ambulance service at the
lowest possible cost.”134  Within the context of abortion, however, “glaring”
and “blatant” conflicts of interest are frequently overlooked,135 and abortion
service providers are often assumed without question to possess a close rela-
tionship with nonlitigant women sufficient to justify third-party standing.136
While some litigants attempt to downplay the significance of conflicting
interests by arguing that state regulations with the appearance of promoting
patient health and safety achieve neither aim, such arguments fail to justify
third-party standing for abortion service providers because the ability for a
plaintiff to avail a court for redress requires a prerequisite showing of stand-
ing that cannot hinge on the plaintiff’s ability to prove the merits of their
argument at trial.137
Finally, an insurmountable obstacle to granting third-party standing to
abortion service providers is the fact that, in a significant number of cases,
132 Denise Harle, Symposium: A Long-Awaited Opportunity to Close the Loophole on Third-
Party Standing, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/01/symposium-a-long-awaited-opportunity-to-close-the-loophole-on-third-party-stand-
ing/.
133 Id. (citing examples of suits brought by abortion providers, “not women,” challeng-
ing regulations requiring the sterilization of abortion instruments and the requirement
that doctors performing abortions be licensed physicians).
134 705 F.2d 1005, 1016 (8th Cir. 1983).  On appeal, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari.  Gold Cross Ambulance Co. v. City of Kansas City, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985).
135 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2166 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Like any other regulated entity, an abortion provider has a financial interest in avoiding
burdensome regulations . . . .  Women seeking abortions, on the other hand, have an
interest in the preservation of regulations that protect their health.  The conflict inherent
in such a situation is glaring.”).
136 Ed Whelan, Pending Supreme Court Abortion Case: Against Aberrational Third-Party
Standing, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/
pending-supreme-court-abortion-case-against-aberrational-third-party-standing/ (“For
decades, the federal courts have simply assumed that abortion providers have third-party
standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients.”); 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 15, § 3531.9.3.
137 See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2166 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the relationship between the litigants and the third-party, nonlitigant women
is purely hypothetical.138  In Kowalski, the Court clearly stated that litigants
do not share a “close relationship” with nonlitigants sufficient to attain third-
party standing where the alleged relationship is hypothetical.139  Indeed, the
Court has even held that physicians lack standing to defend state abortion
regulations on the theory that unborn children constitute possible future
patients.140  A consistent application of this rule would have necessitated a
denial of standing to abortion service providers and physicians in many of the
Court’s landmark abortion decisions, including June Medical, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, Gonzales v. Carhart, Stenberg v. Carhart, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, among others, all of which granted standing to litigants claiming to
vindicate the rights of future hypothetical patients.141  Simply put, abortion
service providers and future hypothetical patients do not merely lack a close
relationship—they in fact “have no relationship at all.”142
B. Genuine Obstacle
When analyzing the “genuine obstacle” factor, the Singleton plurality
noted two impediments facing nonlitigant women seeking abortion services.
First, the Court expressed concerns that a woman’s pursuit of an abortion
may be “chilled” by the countervailing desire to protect her privacy from the
publicity of a lawsuit.143  Second, the plurality pointed to the “imminent
mootness . . . of any individual woman’s claim,” observing the time-sensitive
nature of a pregnancy that imposes a limited window on the ability of women
to seek an abortion.144  However, the plurality itself acknowledged that these
obstacles did not impose a serious hindrance.145  In addressing the privacy
138 See Thomas M. Fisher, Symposium: As States Seek to Protect Women, the Court with June
Medical Services Has Multiple Ways to End Abortion Litigation Free-for-All, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
28, 2020, 10:09 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/symposium-as-states-seek-to-
protect-women-the-court-with-june-medical-services-has-multiple-ways-to-end-abortion-liti-
gation-free-for-all/ (“The ability of abortion practitioners to assert the 14th Amendment
rights of hypothetical future patients has been at the core of abortion providers’ litigation
strategy for several decades.”).
139 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
140 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2174 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986)).
141 See id. at 2170 (Alito, J., dissenting); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292, 2323 & n.1 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Editorial Bd., Opinion, Not
About Roe v. Wade, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/not-about-roe-
v-wade-11583281645 (“[A] six Justice majority in Kowalski (2004) rejected third-party stand-
ing for attorneys seeking to vindicate the legal rights of hypothetical future clients.  The
same principle should apply to abortion providers.”).
142 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 131 (2004).
143 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (plurality opinion).
144 Id.
145 See id. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The plurality virtu-
ally concedes, as it must, that the two alleged ‘obstacles’ to the women’s assertion of their
rights are chimerical.”).
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concern, the Court observed that a suit “may be brought under a pseudo-
nym, as so frequently has been done.”146  Moreover, the Court outlined two
solutions to the “imminent mootness” hindrance.  First, the plurality noted
that “[a] woman who is no longer pregnant may nonetheless retain the right
to litigate the point because it is ‘capable of repetition yet evading
review.’”147  Second, the Court found that “a class could be assembled, whose
fluid membership always included some women with live claims.”148  Despite
refuting their own raised concerns, the Court nevertheless reasoned that
third-party standing was appropriate on the basis that, if nonlitigant patients
could have their rights vindicated by a class of representative women, there
would be “little loss in terms of effective advocacy” in allowing nonlitigant
women to have their rights vindicated by an abortion physician.149
Even without examining the Court’s retreat from such sweepingly broad
constructions of the “genuine obstacle” prong in Kowalski, the plurality’s
rationale in Singleton fails on its own terms.  In essence, the Singleton plurality
conceded that the obstacles faced by third parties were insignificant but
nonetheless granted third-party standing to physicians on the grounds that
the differences between the assertion of a claim by a class of similarly situated
women as opposed to abortion providers were insignificant.  Regardless of
whether this claim is true—and it certainly would not be if a physician-litigant
failed the “close relationship” prong of the test—the Court’s narrow focus on
the effectiveness of a litigant’s advocacy wholly ignores the first prudential
concern outlined by the plurality as a justification for prohibiting third-party
standing: “[C]ourts should not adjudicate . . . rights unnecessarily, and it may
be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or
will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is suc-
cessful or not.”150  Thus, even if nonlitigant patients could attain equally
effective representation by physicians as they could from a class of similarly
situated women, the Court’s alternative and equally important rationale for
the prudential prohibition on third-party standing necessitates a denial of jus
tertii standing to abortion service providers.
Aside from the plurality’s own internal inconsistencies in Singleton, the
majority opinion in Kowalski all but forecloses the argument that patients
generally face a sufficient obstacle to justify jus tertii standing.  In particular,
the majority in Kowalski “looked to practical judicial examples of similar first-
party plaintiffs bringing their own suits as conclusive evidence that there was
no qualifying hindrance,”151 pointing to three instances where criminal
defendants had navigated the appeals process as pro se litigants.152  In com-
146 Id. at 117 (plurality opinion).
147 Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1973)).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 117–18.
150 Id. at 113–14 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
151 Wallace, supra note 69, at 1404.
152 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 132 (2004).
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parison, the Singleton plurality readily admitted that women “frequently” used
pseudonyms to preserve their privacy during litigation, in addition to outlin-
ing exceptions to mootness and class actions suits as mechanisms that ensure
the viability of women vindicating their own rights in court.  In short,
“[n]either mootness nor publicity was an actual obstacle to women bringing
their own legal challenges when the Court decided Singleton, and neither is
an obstacle today.”153
In addition to the two obstacles cited in Singleton, some proponents of
applying the jus tertii doctrine to abortion service providers have cited other
challenges faced by women in bringing their own suits.  In particular, such
obstacles include the general financial burdens of litigation, especially in
light of the fact that women from marginalized communities are more likely
to elect to undergo abortion procedures.154  However, the Court in Kowalski
rejected a comparable argument, finding that third-party rightsholders did
not face a hindrance to vindicating their own rights sufficient to justify third-
party standing, despite the fact that the third parties were indigent, unsophis-
ticated criminal defendants.155  Moreover, many nonprofit advocacy
groups—such as the Center for Reproductive Rights and the American Civil
Liberties Union—represent women in their challenges to abortion laws, in
addition to the numerous law firms that represent low-income women on a
pro bono basis.156  Finally, the vulnerable position of many women litigants
who seek abortion services ought to make courts more skeptical of “self-
appointed advocates” claiming to represent their interests, “especially in the
context of challenges to laws designed to protect those patients.”157
C. June Medical
For purposes of standing doctrine, the Court’s ruling in June Medical is
significant because it represents the first time the Court has addressed third-
party standing in the abortion context since the refinement of the jus tertii
doctrine in Kowalski.  While the Court has “reflexively allowed” abortion ser-
vice providers to litigate the rights of nonlitigant, third-party women in the
wake of the Kowalski ruling, the issue of third-party standing in such cases was
153 Slattery, supra note 96.  As Justice Gorsuch noted in June Medical, “whatever the
supposition of a 1976 plurality, in the years since interested women have challenged abor-
tion regulations on their own behalf in case after case.”  June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103, 2174 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (first citing McCormack v. Herzog,
788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015); then citing Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir.
1996); and then citing Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986)).
154 Hannah Tuschman, Challenging TRAP Laws: A Defense of Standing for Abortion Provid-
ers, 34 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 235, 262 (2019).
155 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 132.
156 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2168–69 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is little reason
to think that a woman who challenges an abortion restriction will have to pay for coun-
sel.”); Editorial Bd., supra note 141; Amy Howe, Symposium: Abortion Debate Returns to the
Roberts Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 27, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/
01/symposium-abortion-debate-returns-to-the-roberts-court/.
157 Brief for the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, supra note 127, at 40.
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never explicitly raised and defended by the Court, thereby failing to consti-
tute new precedent on the issue.158  Accordingly, June Medical presented the
Court with an opportunity to extend the precedent of Kowalski to the context
of abortion jurisprudence, correct the obsolete holding in Singleton, and
bring a level of uniformity to the Court’s rule against third-party standing.
The Court declined to do so.
Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in June Medical offered no new substan-
tive defenses of third-party standing in abortion cases to the rationales
already offered in Singleton.  Rather, the Court began by flatly stating that the
prohibition on third-party standing was a prudential rule159—a shift away
from the Court’s recent sentiment that the rule may actually be a constitu-
tional requirement grounded in Article III.160  As a prudential rule, the plu-
rality found that it could be forfeited and waived, which the Court held was
the case in this instance since the State had failed to raise the issue at the
district court below.161  Although this finding could have been sufficient for
the Court to dismiss the third-party standing challenge, the plurality contin-
ued to address the substance of the State’s claim on third-party standing.
“We have long permitted abortion providers to invoke the rights of their
actual or potential patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations,” the
Court declared, and this “long line of well-established precedents foreclose[s
the State’s] belated challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing.”162  The plurality’s
reliance on precedent was paired with the assertion that, since the State’s
health and safety regulations directly affected abortion clinics, abortion ser-
vice providers were “‘the least awkward’ and most ‘obvious’ claimants” to
challenge the State’s regulations.163  As for Chief Justice Roberts’s concur-
rence, which was the deciding fifth vote in the case, his contribution to the
Court’s standing analysis was contained in a single, footnoted sentence: “For
the reasons the plurality explains, I agree that the abortion providers in this
case have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients.”164
Perhaps of more significance to the Court’s holding were the issues not
discussed by the plurality or Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence.  Conspicu-
ously absent from the Court’s rationale was any discussion of either the “close
relationship” or “genuine obstacle” prong of the Court’s two-part test for
third-party standing.165  Relatedly, there was no discussion of the conflicting
158 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2146–47 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); then citing Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); then citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.,
546 U.S. 320 (2006); then citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); then citing
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam); and then citing Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
159 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2117 (plurality opinion).
160 See id. at 2143–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2117–18 (plurality opinion).
162 Id. at 2118, 2120.
163 Id. at 2119 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
164 Id. at 2139 n.4 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgement) (citation omitted).
165 Id. at 2169 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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interests between abortion service providers and their patients over the
State’s health and safety regulations, nor was there any defense of the fact
that the relationship between the plaintiff and the nonlitigant, third-party
women in the case was merely hypothetical—a point of acute significance for
the Court in denying third-party standing for the litigants in Kowalski.166
Rather, the Court merely recited its prior line of abortion precedents, reaf-
firming the practice of “permitt[ing] abortion providers to invoke the rights
of their actual or potential patients” without ever explaining or acknowledg-
ing the conflict between the Court’s older abortion precedents and the
standing doctrine that would normally apply outside of the abortion context
as outlined in Kowalski.167  Equally absent from the Court’s analysis was any
explicit discussion of how the twin policy rationales underlying the two-pro-
nged test in Singleton168 were furthered by the allowance of third-party stand-
ing to abortion service providers.  Rather than focusing on whether abortion
service providers constituted the “most effective advocates”169 for addressing
a law’s infringement on the legal rights of third parties, the Court instead
inquired whether abortion services providers constituted the “least awkward”
claimants170 for addressing a law’s regulatory burdens—an inquiry notably
absent from both Singleton and Kowalski.
In short, the Court made no effort to reconcile the numerous disparities
that plagued the original Singleton decision as between the black letter stand-
ing requirements and the Court’s holding, nor did the Court address the
incongruences in the jus tertii doctrine as between Singleton and Kowalski.
Despite the Court taking up the question of third-party standing for abortion
service providers, “a majority of the Court all but ignore[d] the question.”171
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDSCAPE
While the judiciary’s discrepant application of the jus tertii standing doc-
trine in abortion cases is problematic on a theoretical level, one might won-
der whether the liberal allowance of third-party standing in abortion cases
has noticeably affected the jurisprudential landscape.  One recent survey sug-
gests an affirmative answer to this inquiry.
The study, conducted by Professor Teresa Stanton Collett, analyzed 637
abortion challenges decided in federal courts between 1973 and 2019.172
Between the Roe decision in 1973 and the Singleton ruling in 1976, thirty-
166 Id.; id. at 2173 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 2118 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
168 Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
169 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976) (plurality opinion).
170 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2119 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197).
171 Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172 Collett, supra note 115.  “State cases and federal cases involving tort or criminal
charges brought against individual doctors for providing abortions, wrongful birth actions,
immigration and/or asylum cases involving abortions that took place in another country,
clinic protest cases, and general birth-control-access actions were excluded from the study.”
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL109.txt unknown Seq: 23  2-NOV-20 13:09
2020] the  double  standard  for  third-party  standing 443
three federal cases—representing 48% of the total number of challenges—
were filed by women, while only twenty-two cases—or 32% of the total num-
ber of challenges—were brought by abortion service providers.173  Since the
Singleton decision in 1976, abortion service providers filed 76% of abortion
challenges in federal courts, with suits brought solely by women declining to
just 11%, along with an additional 12% of cases lodged jointly by women and
abortion service providers.174  In the past ten years alone, abortion service
providers filed 88% of cases in federal courts, with suits brought solely by
women further declining to just 5%, along with an additional 7% of cases
brought jointly by women and abortion service providers.175  When viewed
on an annual basis, cases filed by abortion services providers since 1973 aver-
age 9.1 cases per year, with suits filed exclusively by women averaging 2.1
cases per year, along with 1.6 cases per year filed jointly by women and abor-
tion service providers.176
In addition to the numerical disparity between challenges brought by
abortion service providers in comparison with women, Collett’s study also
evidences a noticeable divide in the type of challenges brought by abortion
service providers as opposed to women.  Women were most likely to bring
challenges seeking public funding for abortion services, in addition to filing
suits against laws that required spousal, parental, or judicial consent.177
Notably, almost no cases were filed solely by women plaintiffs “challenging
conscience rights, informed-consent requirements, fetal-disposition laws and
provider regulations generally.”178  For instance, of the thirty-nine challenges
brought in federal courts against informed consent laws, thirty-seven of the
suits (representing about 95% of such challenges) were brought by abortion
service providers, one challenge was filed solely by a woman, and one addi-
tional case was filed jointly by an abortion service provider and a woman.179
And of the 122 challenges brought in federal courts against abortion pro-
vider regulation laws, 109 of the suits (representing  about 89% of such chal-
lenges) were brought by abortion service providers, three challenges were
filed solely by women, and seven additional cases were filed jointly by abor-
tion service providers and women.180
173 See id.; Brief of Amici Curiae for Concerned Women for America & Charlotte Lozier
Institute, at app. 1–3, June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460).
174 Slattery, supra note 96.
175 Id.
176 Collett, supra note 115. “Since 1976, there have been 16 years in which there were
no cases filed by women alone, and 13 years in which women brought only one.” Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Brief of Amici Curiae for Concerned Women for America & Charlotte Lozier Insti-
tute, supra note 173, at app. 24–25.  Informed consent challenges include challenges to
laws regarding ultrasounds, required information, and reflection periods. Id.
180 Id. at 25.  The study shows that three other challenges were brought by parties who
were neither abortion service providers nor women. Id.  Provider regulation challenges
include challenges to laws regarding admitting requirements, building and zoning, health
and safety, licensure, and reporting. Id. at 25–26.
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These numbers illustrate that the expansion of third-party standing has
had a drastic effect on the landscape of litigants filing challenges to abortion
regulations.  Moreover, in the context of challenges brought against regula-
tions on abortion clinics and doctors, the disparity in the number of suits
brought by women rightsholders and the abortion service providers who
claim to vindicate their rights evidences a definitive misalignment of inter-
ests.  In retrospect, it would seem that Justice Powell’s warning in Singleton
has proven true: the Court’s allowance of third-party standing for abortion
service providers had shown impossible to “cabin,” which has resulted in “liti-
gation by those who perhaps have the least legitimate ground for seeking to
assert the rights of third parties.”181
CONCLUSION
Justice O’Connor once wrote that “no legal rule or doctrine is safe from
ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises
in a case involving state regulation of abortion.”182  The doctrine of standing
is no exception.  Federal courts, at all levels of the judiciary, have granted
third-party standing to litigants challenging state abortion regulations in
clear opposition to black letter standing requirements.  First, abortion service
providers do not share a “close relationship” with the women whose rights
they seek to litigate.  Doctors performing abortions frequently fail to have any
meaningful prior relationship with their patients, and abortion physicians
often seek to litigate the rights of hypothetical third-party women with whom
they have no existing relationship at all.  Moreover, it is often impossible for
abortion service providers to satisfy the “close relationship” requirement
because of the inherent conflicts of interests they have with their hypotheti-
cal patients.  Second, women do not face hindrances sufficient to constitute a
“genuine obstacle” to filing their own legal claims.  The Court has acknowl-
edged this fact since Singleton, and its reluctance to effectuate this prong of
the jus tertii standing test in June Medical is all the more problematic after the
Court’s reinvigoration of the test’s elements in Kowalski.
The effect of the Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of standing
requirements to cases challenging state abortion regulations is plainly evi-
dent.  The jurisprudential landscape in abortion challenges has seen a tre-
mendous shift since the Singleton decision in 1976, with suits brought by
abortion service providers claiming to litigate the interests of women vastly
outnumbering those suits actually filed by women.  In many of these cases,
the standing of abortion service providers to litigate the interests of nonliti-
gant, third-party women is presumed and never questioned.  This Note con-
tends that is a presumption worth questioning.  The Court’s articulation of
181 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 129–30 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
182 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
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the jus tertii doctrine in Kowalski does not permit an exception to the prohibi-
tion on third-party standing for abortion service providers, and the Court’s
ruling in June Medical “is inconsistent with [the Court’s] more recent stand-
ing precedents.”183
183 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2143 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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